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Abstract
An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical
foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin
and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in general social choice
environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition
called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of
dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existence of
such foundations in the single-unit auction setting, and extends the argument to cases
where it was hitherto unknown. To prove this result, we adopt the linear programming
approach to mechanism design. In settings in which the uniform shortest-path tree
condition is violated, maxmin/ Bayesian foundations might not exist. We illustrate this
by two examples: bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders and auction with
type-dependent outside option.
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1 Introduction
Wilson (1987) criticizes applied game theory’s reliance on common knowledge assumptions.
In reaction to Wilson’s critique, the literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of
finding detail-free mechanisms in order to eliminate this reliance.1 The usual approach is
to adopt stronger solution concepts, such as dominant-strategy mechanisms. A dominant-
strategy mechanism does not rely on any assumptions of agents’ beliefs and is robust to
changes in agents’ beliefs. However, dominant-strategy mechanisms constitute just one special
class of detail-free mechanisms. A fundamental issue is to justify the leap from detail-free
mechanisms in general to dominant-strategy mechanisms in particular.
Suppose that a revenue-maximizing mechanism designer has an estimate of the distri-
bution of the agents’ payoff types, but she does not have any reliable information about the
agents’ beliefs (including their beliefs about one another’s payoff types, their beliefs about
these beliefs, etc.), as these are arguably never observed. The mechanism designer ranks
mechanisms according to their worst-case performance - the minimum expected revenue -
where the minimum is taken over all possible agents’ beliefs. The use of dominant-strategy
mechanisms has a maxmin foundation if the mechanism designer finds it optimal to use a
dominant-strategy mechanism.
A closely related notion is the Bayesian foundation. The use of dominant-strategy
mechanisms is said to have a Bayesian foundation if there exists a particular assumption
about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs, against which the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue among all detail-free mechanisms. Note
that if there exists such an assumption, then the worst-case expected revenue of an arbitrary
detail-free mechanism obviously cannot exceed its expected revenue against this particular
assumption, which in turn cannot exceed the worst-case expected revenue of the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism. Therefore, the Bayesian foundation is a stronger notion than
the maxmin foundation.
In the context of a revenue-maximizing auctioneer, Chung and Ely (2007) show that,
under a regularity condition on the distribution of the bidders’ valuations, the use of dominant-
1A detail-free mechanism does not rely on implicit assumptions about higher-order beliefs, and is Bayesian
incentive compatible for all belief hierarchies. In other words, a detail-free mechanism is Bayesian incentive
compatible relative to the universal type space; see Definition 4 for the formal definition.
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strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations. What has been missing thus
far from the literature on mechanism design is the study of such foundations in general
environments. In this paper, we study the maxmin and Bayesian foundations in general
social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. This exposes the
underlying logic of the existence of such foundations in the single-unit auction setting, and
extends the argument to cases where it was hitherto unknown.
Our result builds on the recent literature on the network approach to mechanism design,
in particular, Rochet and Stole (2003), Heydenreich, Müller, Uetz, and Vohra (2009), Vohra
(2011), Kos and Messner (2013), and Sher and Vohra (2015).2 We formulate the optimal
mechanism design question as a network flow problem, and the optimization problem reduces
to determining the shortest-path tree (the union of all shortest-paths from the source to all
nodes) in this network. We say that there is a uniform shortest-path tree if for each agent,
the shortest-path tree is the same for all dominant-strategy implementable decision rules and
other agents’ reports.
We show that under an additional regularity condition, the existence of a uniform
shortest-path tree ensures the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy
mechanisms (Theorem 1). The uniform shortest-path tree is largely responsible for the
success of mechanism design in numerous applications across various fields. Loosely speaking,
the same features that make optimal mechanism design tractable also provide maxmin and
Bayesian foundations for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. To prove this result, we
adopt the linear programming approach to mechanism design, which exposes the underlying
logic behind the existence of such foundations.3 In particular, this gives us a recipe for
constructing the assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs for the Bayesian
foundation.
The uniform shortest-path tree condition is of interest because a number of resource
allocation problems satisfy this condition. We examine its applicability in several prominent
environments. First, the uniform shortest-path tree condition is satisfied in environments with
one-dimensional types. This fits many classical applications of mechanism design, including
2Also see Rochet (1987), Gui, Müller, and Vohra (2004), and Müller, Perea, and Wolf (2007).
3We are indebted to Rakesh Vohra for suggesting the linear programming approach to us. In a recent
paper, Sher and Vohra (2015) use the linear programming approach to study price discrimination when a
buyer may present evidence relevant to her value.
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single-unit auction (e.g., Myerson (1981)), public good (e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)),
and standard bilateral trade (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). The uniform shortest-
path tree condition also holds in multi-unit auctions with homogeneous or heterogeneous
goods, combinatorial auctions and the like, as long as the agents’ private values are one-
dimensional. In such a case, the payoff types are linearly ordered via a single path. Second,
the uniform shortest-path tree condition can also be satisfied in some multi-dimensional
environments. In particular, we consider the multi-unit auction with capacity-constrained
bidders (see Malakhov and Vohra (2009)). In this case, the agent’s payoff types are located
on different paths and are only partially ordered. For both applications, we provide primitive
conditions for regularity.
When the uniform shortest-path tree condition is violated, maxmin/ Bayesian founda-
tions might not exist. We stress that the notion of no maxmin foundation is remarkably strong.
No maxmin foundation means that there exists a single Bayesian mechanism that achieves
strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless
of the agents’ beliefs. Theorem 2 shows that if the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism
exhibits certain properties, we could explicitly construct such a superior Bayesian mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of a revenue maximization setting
in which the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms does not have a maxmin foundation.4
We apply this result to bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders and auction with
type-dependent outside option.
We hasten to emphasize that our analysis on the foundations of dominant-strategy
mechanisms is constrained to the notions of maxmin and Bayesian foundations. There
are, of course, other notions of optimality to examine the foundations of dominant-strategy
mechanisms. We view the maxmin foundation as the minimum requirement that the optimal
mechanism needs to satisfy. Indeed, if the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms does not
have a maxmin foundation, then by definition, there exists a single Bayesian mechanism that
achieves strictly higher expected revenue regardless of the agents’ beliefs. Consequently, it
becomes problematic to rationalize the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. In settings in
which the uniform shortest-path tree condition is violated, dominant-strategy mechanisms
4Chung and Ely (2007, Proposition 2) construct an example in which the Bayesian foundation does not
exist, but their construction is silent about the existence of the maxmin foundation. Bergemann and Morris
(2005) study an implementability problem. Börgers (2017) adopts a different notion of optimality.
5
may not even satisfy the minimum requirement of the maxmin foundation.
A natural question that our paper leaves open is whether there are other mechanisms
that have a maxmin foundation, and among all mechanisms that have a maxmin foundation,
also achieve other desirable properties. We don’t yet know whether the optimistic view of
dominant strategy mechanisms (in settings in which the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms
has a maxmin foundation) will survive once the research agenda is completed. Notably,
Börgers (2017) constructs another mechanism that weakly dominates the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism, in the sense that it never yields lower revenue and sometimes yields
strictly higher revenue.5
The remainder of this introduction discusses some related literature. Section 2 presents
the notations, concepts, and the model. Section 3 formulates the notion of the uniform
shortest-path tree and presents the results. Section 4 studies applications of the results.
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
In a seminal paper, Bergemann and Morris (2005) ask whether a fixed social choice correspon-
dence - mapping payoff type profiles to sets of possible allocations - can or cannot be robustly
partially implemented. Thus they focus on a “yes or no” question. In contrast, we consider
the objective of revenue maximization for the mechanism designer (under her estimate about
the distribution of the agents’ payoff types), allowing all possible beliefs and higher-order
beliefs of the agents. The best mechanism from the point of view of the mechanism designer
will in general not be separable, and thus the results of Bergemann and Morris (2005) do not
apply.
This paper joins a growing literature exploring mechanism design with worst-case
objectives. This includes the seminal work Chung and Ely (2007), and more recently, Carroll
5The construction builds on the possibility of side bets among agents, and the mechanism designer charges
a small fee for each bet. As Börgers points out, the argument would not be valid if the mechanism designer
restricts her attention to the type spaces characterized by Morris (1994), which do not allow speculative
trades. Whether there is a mechanism that weakly dominates the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism
when we consider only type spaces that do not allow profitable side bets is an interesting question for further
research.
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(2015, 2017), Yamashita (2015, 2017), Yamashita and Zhu (2017), and Du (2017), among
many others.
Another recent line of literature studies the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant-
strategy mechanisms; see, for example, Manelli and Vincent (2010), Gershkov, Goeree,
Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013), and Goeree and Kushnir (2017). An important
difference from our work is that these papers focus on independent types.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
There is a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk-neutral agents and a finite set K = {1, 2, . . . , K}
of alternatives. Agent i’s payoff type vi ∈ RK represents her gross utility under the K
alternatives.6 We write vi(k) to denote agent i’s gross utility under alternative k, if her payoff
type is vi. The set of possible payoff types of agent i is a finite set Vi ⊂ RK . The set of
possible payoff type profiles is V = Πi∈IVi with generic payoff type profile v = (v1, v2, . . . , vI).
We write v−i for a payoff type profile of agent i’s opponents, i.e., v−i ∈ V−i = Πj 6=iVj. If Y is
a measurable space, then ∆Y is the set of all probability measures on Y . If Y is a metric
space, then we treat it as a measurable space with its Borel σ-algebra.
2.2 Types
We follow the standard approach to model agents’ information using a type space. A type
space, denoted Ω = (Ωi, fi, gi)i∈I , is defined by a measurable space of types Ωi for each agent,
and a pair of measurable mappings fi : Ωi → Vi, defining the payoff type of each type, and
gi : Ωi → ∆(Ω−i), defining each type’s belief about the types of the other agents.
A type space encodes in a parsimonious way the beliefs and all higher-order beliefs of
the agents. One simple kind of type space is the naive type space generated by a payoff type
distribution pi ∈ ∆ (V ). In the naive type space, each agent believes that all agents’ payoff
types are drawn from the distribution pi, and this is common knowledge. Formally, a naive
type space associated with pi is a type space Ωpi = (Ωi, fi, gi)i∈I such that Ωi = Vi, fi(vi) = vi,
6We may represent the agent’s payoff types in different ways. For instance, when studying one-dimensional
payoff types (Section 4.1), it is more convenient to represent agent i’s payoff type by vi ∈ R.
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and gi(vi)[v−i] = pi(v−i|vi) for every vi and v−i. The naive type space is used almost without
exception in auction theory and mechanism design. The cost of this parsimonious model
is that it implicitly embeds some strong assumptions about the agents’ beliefs, and these
assumptions are not innocuous. For example, if the agents’ payoff types are independent
under pi, then in the naive type space, the agents’ beliefs are common knowledge. On the
other hand, for a generic pi, it is common knowledge that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between payoff types and beliefs. Myerson (1981) characterizes the optimal auction in the
independent case and Crémer and McLean (1988) in the other case. Which of these cases
holds makes a big difference for the structure and welfare properties of the optimal auction.
The spirit of the Wilson Doctrine is to avoid making such assumptions.
To implement the Wilson Doctrine, the common approach is to maintain the naive
type space, but try to diminish its adverse effect by imposing stronger solution concepts. To
provide foundations for this methodology, we have to return to the fundamentals. Formally,
weaker assumptions about the agents’ beliefs are captured by larger type spaces. Indeed,
we can remove these assumptions altogether by allowing for every conceivable hierarchy of
higher-order beliefs. By the results of Mertens and Zamir (1985), there exists a universal
type space, Ω∗ = (Ω∗i , f ∗i , g∗i )i∈I , with the property that, for every payoff type vi and every
infinite hierarchy of beliefs hˆi, there is a type ωi ∈ Ω∗i of agent i with payoff type vi and
whose hierarchy is hˆi. Moreover, each Ω∗i is a compact topological space.7
When we start with the universal type space, we remove any implicit assumptions
about the agents’ beliefs. We can now explicitly model any such assumption as a probability
distribution over the agents’ universal types. Specifically, an assumption for the mechanism
designer is a distribution µ over Ω∗.
2.3 Mechanisms
A mechanism consists of a set of messages Mi for each agent i, a decision rule p : M → ∆K
and payment functions ti : M → R. Each agent i selects a message from Mi. Based on
the resulting profile of messages m, the decision rule p specifies the outcome from ∆K
(lotteries are allowed) and the payment function ti specifies the transfer from agent i to the
mechanism designer. Agent i obtains utility p · vi − ti. We write pk for the probability that
7Also see Heifetz and Neeman (2006).
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alternative k is chosen. We find it convenient to work with direct-revelation mechanisms.
In a direct-revelation mechanism for type space Ω = (Ωi, fi, gi)i∈I , Mi = Ωi; that is, agents
directly report their types to the mechanism designer.
The mechanism defines a game form, which together with the type space constitutes
a game of incomplete information. The mechanism design problem is to fix a solution
concept and search for the mechanism that delivers the maximum expected revenue for the
mechanism designer in some outcome consistent with the solution concept. To implement
the Wilson Doctrine and minimize the role of assumptions built into the naive type space,
the common approach is to adopt a strong solution concept which does not rely on these
assumptions. In practice, the solution concept that is often used for this purpose is dominant-
strategy equilibrium. The revelation principle holds, and we can restrict attention to direct
mechanisms.
Definition 1. A direct-revelation mechanism Γ for type space Ω is dominant-strategy incentive
compatible (dsIC) if for each agent i and type profile ω ∈ Ω,
p(ω) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω) ≥ 0, and
p(ω) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω) ≥ p(ω′i, ω−i) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω′i, ω−i),
for any alternative type ω′i ∈ Ωi.
Definition 2. A dominant-strategy mechanism is a dsIC direct-revelation mechanism for the
naive type space Ωpi. We denote by Φ the class of all dominant-strategy mechanisms.
To provide a foundation for using dominant-strategy mechanisms, we shall compare it
to the route of completely eliminating common knowledge assumptions about beliefs. We
maintain the standard solution concept of Bayesian equilibrium, but now we enlarge the
type space all the way to the universal type space. By the revelation principle, we restrict
attention to direct mechanisms.
Definition 3. A direct-revelation mechanism Γ for type space Ω = (Ωi, fi, gi) is Bayesian
incentive compatible (BIC) if for each agent i and type ωi ∈ Ωi,∫
Ω−i
(p(ω) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω)) gi(ωi)dω−i ≥ 0, and∫
Ω−i
(p(ω) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω)) gi(ωi)dω−i ≥
∫
Ω−i
(p(ω′i, ω−i) · fi(ωi)− ti(ω′i, ω−i)) gi(ωi)dω−i
for any alternative type ω′i ∈ Ωi.
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A mechanism, which does not rely on implicit assumptions about higher-order beliefs,
should be incentive compatible for all belief hierarchies. In other words, it should be BIC
relative to the universal type space.
Definition 4. Let Ψ be the class of all BIC direct-revelation mechanism for the universal
type space. We say that such a mechanism is detail-free.
For simplicity of exposition, we add a dummy type v0 for each agent i ∈ I and set
p(v0, v−i) · vi = ti(v0, v−i) = 0 for all vi ∈ Vi, v−i ∈ V−i.
2.4 The mechanism designer as a maxmin decision maker
The mechanism designer has an estimate of the distribution of the agents’ payoff types, pi.
Following Chung and Ely (2007), we assume that pi has full support. An assumption µ about
the distribution of the payoff types and beliefs of the agents is consistent with this estimate
if the induced marginal distribution on V is pi. LetM(pi) denote the compact subset of such
assumptions. For any mechanism Γ, the µ-expected revenue of Γ is
Rµ(Γ) =
∫
Ω∗
∑
i∈I
ti(ω)dµ(ω).
We do not assume that the mechanism designer has confidence in the naive type space
as his model of agents’ beliefs. Rather he considers other assumptions within the setM(pi)
as possible as well. The mechanism designer who chooses a mechanism that maximizes the
worst-case performance solves the maxmin problem of
sup
Γ∈Ψ
inf
µ∈M(pi)
Rµ(Γ).
If the mechanism designer used an optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, then his
revenue would be
ΠD(pi) = sup
Γ∈Φ
Rpi(Γ),
where
Rpi(Γ) =
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v)
for any dominant-strategy mechanism Γ ∈ Φ.
Definition 5. The use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has a maxmin foundation if
ΠD(pi) = sup
Γ∈Ψ
inf
µ∈M(pi)
Rµ(Γ).
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The use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has a Bayesian foundation if for some belief
µ∗ ∈M(pi),
ΠD(pi) = sup
Γ∈Ψ
Rµ∗(Γ).
The Bayesian foundation is a stronger notion than the maxmin foundation. The
Bayesian foundation says that there exists an assumption about (the distribution of) agents’
beliefs, against which the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism achieves the highest expected
revenue among all detail-free mechanisms. It follows that the worst-case expected revenue of
an arbitrary detail-free mechanism cannot exceed its expected revenue against this particular
assumption, which in turn cannot exceed the worst-case expected revenue of the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism. We record this observation as the following proposition.8
Proposition 1. If the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has a Bayesian foundation, then
it has a maxmin foundation.
3 Results
We can formulate the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design problem as follows:
max
p(·), ti(·)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v) (DIC)
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v′i ∈ Vi ∪ {v0}, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,
p(vi, v−i) · vi − ti(vi, v−i) ≥ p(v′i, v−i) · vi − ti(v′i, v−i), (1)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K, pk(v) ≥ 0, (2)
∀v ∈ V, ∑
k∈K
pk(v) = 1. (3)
In the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design problem (DIC), the mechanism
designer maximizes expected revenue by choosing (p, t), subject to incentive constraints (1)
and feasibility constraints (2) - (3). We denote by VDIC the value of the objective function of
the program (DIC) at an optimum.
Say that a decision rule p is dsIC if there exists transfer scheme t such that the
mechanism (p, t) satisfies the incentive constraints (1). We omit the proof of the following
standard lemma, due to Rochet (1987).
8Also see Chung and Ely (2007, Section 2.5).
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Lemma 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for a decision rule p to be dsIC is the
following cyclical monotonicity condition: ∀i ∈ I, ∀v−i ∈ V−i, and for every sequence of
payoff types of agent i, (vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,t) with vi,t = vi,1, we have
t−1∑
n=1
[
p(vi,n, v−i) · vi,n+1 − p(vi,n, v−i) · vi,n
]
≤ 0. (4)
3.1 Uniform shortest-path tree
We first collect some graph-theoretic terminology used in the sequel.
Definition 6. Fix a dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i. (1) The set of
nodes for agent i is Vi ∪ {v0}; (2) For any vi ∈ Vi and v′i ∈ {Vi \ {vi}} ∪ {v0}, v′i → vi is a
directed edge with length p(vi, v−i) · vi − p(v′i, v−i) · vi; and (3) A path from the dummy type
v0 to payoff type vi,t ∈ Vi is a sequence P = (v0, vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,t) of nodes where (i) vi,j ∈ Vi,
∀j = 1, 2, . . . , t; and (ii) j 6= j′ =⇒ vi,j 6= vi,j′.
We can decompose the mechanism designer’s problem (DIC) into two steps. In the
first step, we fix a decision rule p that is dsIC, and optimize over the transfer scheme t. In
the second step, we optimal over the dsIC decision rule p.
Fix a dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i. The optimization problem over
the the transfer scheme t has a corresponding network flow problem that can be described in
the following way. Introduce one node for each type vi ∈ Vi ∪ {v0} (the node corresponding
to the dummy type v0 will be the source), and to each directed edge v′i → vi, assign a
length of p(vi, v−i) · vi − p(v′i, v−i) · vi. The optimization problem reduces to determining
the shortest-path tree (the union of shortest-paths from the source to all nodes) in this
network. Edges on the shortest-path tree correspond to binding dominant-strategy incentive
constraints. Readers unfamiliar with network flows may consult Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin
(1993) and Vohra (2011).
Definition 7. Fix a dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i. A shortest-path
tree is the union of shortest-paths from the source to all nodes such that if v′i belongs to the
shortest-path from the source v0 to some vi ∈ Vi, the truncation of the path from v0 to v′i
defines the shortest-path from v0 to v′i.
Definition 8. There is a uniform shortest-path tree if, for each agent i ∈ I, there is the
same shortest-path tree for all dsIC decision rules p and other agents’ reports v−i.
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When the uniform shortest-path tree condition is satisfied, we can drop the dependence
of the shortest-path tree on p and v−i. A uniform shortest-path tree induces a partial
order on agents’ payoff types. For a typical shortest-path (v0, vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,t), we write
vi,t i vi,t−1 i . . . i vi,1 i v0. It is convenient to represent the uniform shortest-path tree
of agent i using i and its transitive closure by +i . For notational convenience, we write
v′i +i vi if v′i +i vi or v′i = vi. If vi i v′i, we sometimes denote v′i by v−i .
3.2 Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
In this subsection, we consider environments in which the uniform shortest-path tree condition
holds. For any dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i, it suffices to only consider
constraints that correspond to edges on the shortest-path tree. In settings in which the
uniform shortest-path tree condition holds, the edges on the shortest-path tree are the
same, for any dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i. Therefore, in the grand
maximization problem (DIC), it suffices to only consider constraints that correspond to
these edges, subject to that the decision rule p satisfies the cyclical monotonicity constraint
(4). As is standard in the mechanism design literature, we first consider the following relaxed
problem, in which we ignore the cyclical monotonicity constraint. A regularity condition
on pi is then imposed to ensure that some optimal decision rule p∗ that solves the relaxed
maximization problem automatically satisfies the cyclical monotonicity constraint.
max
p(·), ti(·)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v) (DIC − P )
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,
p(vi, v−i) · vi − ti(vi, v−i) ≥ p(v−i , v−i) · vi − ti(v−i , v−i), (5)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K, pk(v) ≥ 0, (6)
∀v ∈ V,∑
k∈K
pk(v) = 1. (7)
By compactness arguments, the maximization problem (DIC − P ) has a finite optimal
value. Denote by VDIC−P the value of the objective function of the program (DIC − P ) at
an optimum.
Definition 9. We say that pi is regular if the cyclical monotonicity constraint (4) is auto-
matically satisfied for some p∗ that solves the optimization problem (DIC − P ).
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal definition of regularity in the general
environments. Our definition of regularity captures how it has been used in the literature;
see for example, Myerson (1981). That is, we first ask which decision rule p the mechanism
designer would choose if she does not have to make sure that the decision rule satisfies the
cyclical monotonicity constraint. The regularity condition is then imposed to make sure that
such optimal decision rule automatically satisfies the cyclical monotonicity constraint. In the
applications that we study in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, additional structure is imposed,
and we provide primitive conditions for regularity.
Theorem 1 below provides a sufficient condition for the maxmin and Bayesian foundations
of dominant-strategy mechanisms.
Theorem 1. In environments in which the uniform shortest-path tree condition holds, if pi is
regular, then the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations.
By Proposition 1, it suffices to show the Bayesian foundation. In other words, it suffices
to identify one particular assumption about (the distribution of) agents’ beliefs such that
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue among all
detail-free mechanisms. To prove this result, we adopt the linear programming approach to
mechanism design. In particular, we make use of the duality theorem in linear programming.
In what follows, we first provide a sketch of the proof, and then compare our proof technique
with that of Chung and Ely (2007).
The structure of the proof is as follows. Step (1) considers the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism design problem. We shall work with the maximization problem (DIC − P ) and
derive its dual (DIC − D). This is without loss of generality, as the regularity condition
ensures that VDIC = VDIC−P . Step (2) restricts attention to a subclass of type spaces,
formulates the optimal Bayesian mechanism design problem (BIC − P ), and derives its dual
(BIC −D). We denote by VDIC−D (resp. VBIC−P and VBIC−D) the value of the objective
function of the program (DIC − D) (resp. (BIC − P ) and (BIC − D)) at an optimum.
Step (3) then explicitly constructs an assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’
beliefs, against which we show that, VDIC−D ≥ VBIC−D. It follows from the duality theorem
in linear programming (see for example, Bradley, Hax, and Magnanti (1977, Chapter 4)) that
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VDIC−P = VDIC−D ≥ VBIC−D ≥ VBIC−P .9 Therefore, we have identified an assumption about
(the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs, against which VDIC ≥ VBIC−P . The details of the
proof are relegated to the Appendix.
We now compare our duality approach with that of Chung and Ely (2007). Both
approaches seek to identify an assumption against which the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue among all detail-free mechanisms. Chung
and Ely (2007) work with the primal maximization problems, and compares the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism design problem and the optimal Bayesian mechanism design
problem. They have to identify an assumption such that no feasible variables in the Bayesian
mechanism design problem could generate a higher revenue than the optimal value of the
dominant-strategy mechanism design problem. In particular, Chung and Ely (2007) have to
explicitly identify the set of binding constraints under the optimal Bayesian mechanism design
problem. This approach involves a complex set of algebra which makes the construction
of the assumption less transparent. Furthermore, their analysis requires the discussions of
different cases, namely, the nonsingular case and the singular case. They first show the
foundation result in the nonsingular case and then rely on a limiting argument to establish
the foundation result in the singular case.
Whereas in the duality approach that we take, we have the benefit of directly manipu-
lating the dual variables. It suffices to identify an assumption such that there exists one set
of dual variables of the Bayesian minimization problem that generates the same objective
value as the optimal value of the dominant-strategy minimization problem. This greatly
simplifies the analysis. We do not have to explicitly identify the set of binding constraints in
the optimal Bayesian mechanism design problem. Furthermore, our approach dispenses the
discussion of the nonsingular versus singular cases. The key part of the proof is to construct
the assumption about (the distribution) of agents’ beliefs. As we shall see in Step (3) of the
proof, this assumption can be easily identified using the dual variables.
9To apply the strong duality theorem, one has to show that the optimal value of the programming
problem is finite. This follows from compactness arguments in the case of the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism design problem. Thus, by the strong duality theorem, we have VDIC−P = VDIC−D. In the case
of the optimal Bayesian mechanism design problem, it suffices to invoke the weak duality theorem for our
purpose. Our arguments do not require (and actually show) that the optimal value of the optimal Bayesian
mechanism design problem is finite.
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Remark 1. Our paper focuses on the private-value setting. The uniform shortest-path
tree condition has a natural counterpart in the interdependent-value setting that, under an
additional regularity condition, ensures the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of ex post
incentive compatible mechanisms. We sketch below how to modify the notion of the uniform
shortest-path tree to accommodate the interdependent-value setting. The proof of Theorem 1
can be easily adopted, and we won’t repeat the arguments. In interdependent-value settings,
agent i’s gross utility under each of the alternatives depends on the payoff types of her
opponents. When agent i has payoff type vi, we use vi(v−i) ∈ RK to denote her gross
utility under the K alternatives, when her opponents have payoff types v−i. Fix a dsIC
decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i, (1) the set of nodes for agent i is Vi ∪ {v0};
(2) For any vi ∈ Vi and v′i ∈ {Vi \ {vi}} ∪ {v0}, v′i → vi is a directed edge with length
p(vi, v−i) · vi(v−i)− p(v′i, v−i) · vi(v−i). The path, shortest-path tree, uniform shortest-path tree,
and regularity condition can be defined accordingly.
3.3 No foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
In this subsection, we show that when the uniform shortest-path tree condition is violated,
maxmin/ Bayesian foundations might not exist. Note that in settings in which the uniform
shortest-path tree condition is violated, it is difficult to find the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism, not to mention the construction of a superior Bayesian mechanism. To have a
meaningful discussion, we shall take the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism (the binding
structure, and payments of the agents) as primitives. While the conditions of the theorem
may be restrictive, the conditions can be verified whenever the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism can be solved (possibly by a linear programming solver). We apply Theorem
2 to bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders in Section 4.3, and to auction with
type-dependent outside option in Section 4.4.
Theorem 2. In environments with two agents and binary payoff types for each agent, if for
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism
v1 v
′
1
v2 p(v1, v2), t1(v1, v2), t2(v1, v2) p(v′1, v2), t1(v′1, v2), t2(v′1, v2)
v′2 p(v1, v′2), t1(v1, v′2), t2(v1, v′2) p(v′1, v′2), t1(v′1, v′2), t2(v′1, v′2)
16
1) binding structure:
p(v1, v′2) · v2 − t2(v1, v′2) < 0,
and p(v′1, v′2) · v2 − t2(v′1, v′2) > 0;
2) payment dominance:
t1(v1, v′2) + t2(v1, v′2) ≥ t1(v1, v2) + t2(v1, v2),
and t1(v′1, v′2) + t2(v′1, v′2) > t1(v′1, v2) + t2(v′1, v2),
then there is neither a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
Under the binding structure in Theorem 2, the uniform shortest-path tree condition is
violated. Let
x = p(v1, v2) · v2 − t2(v1, v2);
y = p(v′1, v2) · v2 − t2(v′1, v2);
z = p(v1, v′2) · v2 − t2(v1, v′2) < 0;
w = p(v′1, v′2) · v2 − t2(v′1, v′2) > 0.
Since the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism necessarily satisfies the incentive constraints,
we have x ≥ 0, y ≥ w > 0. Furthermore, it must be the case that x = 0, and y = w.
Otherwise, the dominant-strategy mechanism would not have been optimal. In words, when
agent 1’s payoff type is v1, the participation constraint of payoff type v2 is binding (x = 0),
and the incentive constraint corresponding to payoff type v2 mimicking payoff type v′2 is not
binding (z < 0). When agent 1’s payoff type is v′1, the participation constraint of payoff type
v2 is not binding, and the incentive constraint corresponding to payoff type v2 mimicking
payoff type v′2 is binding (y = w > 0).
We show that there is no maxmin foundation. In particular, we explicitly construct
a single Bayesian mechanism that does strictly better than the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism, regardless of the assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs. Since
the Bayesian foundation is a stronger notion than the maxmin foundation (Proposition 1),
this further implies that there is no Bayesian foundation.
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We use a to denote the first-order belief of payoff type v2 of agent 2 that agent 1
has payoff type v1. In the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, agent 1 has a dominant
strategy to truthfully report her payoff type. We can think of agent 2 choosing between
two lotteries. The first lottery is p(v1, v2), t2(v1, v1) with probability a and p(v′1, v2), t2(v′1, v2)
with probability 1 − a.10 The second lottery is p(v1, v′2), t2(v1, v′2) with probability a and
p(v′1, v′2), t2(v′1, v′2) with probability 1− a. Agent 2 with payoff type v2 prefers the first lottery,
and agent 2 with payoff type v′2 prefers the second lottery.
Our argument centers around increasing the payment from agent 2 at the type profile
(v′1, v2). We amend the first lottery as follows: p(v1, v2), t2(v1, v2) with probability a and
p(v′1, v2), t2(v′1, v2) + y with probability 1− a. The second lottery is left unchanged. Although
the increase in payment necessarily violates the dominant-strategy incentive constraints, for
agent 2 with payoff type v2, if she believes with sufficiently high probability (a ≥ zw−z ) that
agent 1’s valuation is v1, she prefers the amended first lottery, since it delivers expected
utility of 0 and the second lottery delivers expected utility of az + (1 − a)w. This weakly
increased the designer’ expected revenue, since y > 0. If agent 2 with payoff type v2 believes
with sufficiently low probability (a < z
w−z ) that agent 1’s valuation is v1, she would now
prefer the second lottery. But following the payment dominance condition in Theorem 2, this
also weakly increases the seller’s expected revenue. As agent 2 with payoff type v′2 prefers
the second lottery to the original first lottery, she also prefers the second lottery to the
amended lottery. Agent 1 still has a dominant strategy in the new mechanism. The proof
below formally shows this intuition, and verifies the incentive constraints for the universal
type space.
Proof of Theorem 2. We show that the mechanism designer could employ a single Bayesian
mechanism and achieve a strictly higher expected revenue than he does using the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the agents’ beliefs. We first explicitly identify
one such mechanism and proceed by verifying that (1) the mechanism is BIC for the universal
type space; and (2) the mechanism achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than the
optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption about (the distribution
of) the agents’ beliefs.
10We ignore the payment from agent 1 to the mechanism designer for now, since such payment does not
have any effect on agent 2’s incentive.
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Consider the following Bayesian mechanism Γ′. In this mechanism, the designer elicits
agent 2’s first-order belief about agent 1’s payoff type.11
v1 v
′
1
v2, a ∈ [0, ww−z ) p(v1, v′2), t1(v1, v′2), t2(v1, v′2) p(v′1, v′2), t1(v′1, v′2), t2(v′1, v′2)
v2, a ∈ [ ww−z , 1] p(v1, v2), t1(v1, v2), t2(v1, v2) p(v′1, v2), t1(v′1, v2), t2(v′1, v2) + y
v′2 p(v1, v′2), t1(v1, v′2), t2(v1, v′2) p(v′1, v′2), t1(v′1, v′2), t2(v′1, v′2)
To see that Γ′ is BIC for the universal type space, note that
i truth telling continues to be a dominant strategy for agent 1;
ii truth telling continues to be a dominant strategy for payoff type v′2 of agent 2;
iii agent 2 with payoff type v2 and a ∈ [0, ww−z ) will not announce v′2 as utility is unchanged;
iv agent 2 with payoff type v2 and a ∈ [ ww−z , 1] will not announce v′2 as expected utility is
lower; and
v between v2, a ∈ [0, ww−z ) and v2, a ∈ [ ww−z , 1], agent 2 with payoff type v2 will announce
v2, a ∈ [ ww−z , 1] if and only if a ∈ [ ww−z , 1].
To see that Γ′ achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’
beliefs, note that
vi t1(v1, v′2) + t2(v1, v′2) ≥ t1(v1, v2) + t2(v1, v2);
vii t1(v′1, v′2) + t2(v′1, v′2) > t1(v′1, v2) + t2(v′1, v2);
viii y = w > 0;
ix pi has full support.
11An interesting aspect of the mechanism Γ′ is that it suffices for the designer to elicit agent 2’s first-order
belief. In other words, agent 2’s optimal strategic choice can be based on her first-order belief alone. There is
no need for her to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant for her optimal choice. The
mechanism Γ′ is strategically simple in the terminology of Börgers and Li (2017).
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Remark 2. For ease of exposition, we state Theorem 2 in environments with two agents
and binary payoff types for each agent. The argument extends to environments with multiple
agents and each agent has multiple payoff types, as long as there are two agents and two
payoff types for each agent, where the structure as stated in Theorem 2 exists.
4 Applications
This section considers various applications of our results. The uniform shortest-path tree
condition holds in the standard social choice environment with one-dimensional payoff types as
well as some multi-dimensional environments. Section 4.1 applies Theorem 1 to environments
with one-dimensional types, and Section 4.2 to a multi-dimensional environment. For both
applications, we provide primitive conditions for regularity. Section 4.3 applies Theorem 2 to
the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified traders, and Section 4.4 to auction with
type-dependent outside option.
4.1 One-dimensional payoff types
In this subsection, we consider the standard social choice environment with one-dimensional
payoff types.12 This fits many classical applications of mechanism design, including single-
unit auction (e.g., Myerson (1981)), public good (e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)), and
standard bilateral trade (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
There is a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk neutral agents and a finite set K =
{1, 2, . . . , K} of social alternatives. Agent i’s gross utility in alternative k equals uki (vi) = aki vi,
where vi ∈ R is agent i’s payoff type, aki ∈ R are constants and aki ≥ 0 for all k. Agent i with
payoff type vi obtains utility
p(v) · Aivi − ti(v)
for decision rule p ∈ ∆K and transfer ti, where Ai = (a11, a2i , . . . , aKi ). For notational simplicity,
we assume that each agent has M possible payoff types, and that the set Vi is the same for
12This set-up covers the environment studied in Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013,
Section 2).
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each agent: Vi = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}, where vm − vm−1 = γ for each m = 2, 3, . . . ,M and some
γ > 0.
We can formulate the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design problem as follows:
max
p(·), t(·)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v)
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀m, l = 1, 2, . . . ,M, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,
p(vm, v−i) · Aivm − ti(vm, v−i) ≥ 0, (8)
p(vm, v−i) · Aivm − ti(vm, v−i) ≥ p(vl, v−i) · Aivm − ti(vl, v−i). (9)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K, pk(v) ≥ 0,
∀v ∈ V,∑
k∈K
pk(v) = 1.
In the environment with one-dimensional payoff types, we say that a decision rule p is
dsIC if there exists transfer scheme t such that the mechanism (p, t) satisfies the incentive
constraints (8) and (9).
Uniform shortest-path tree condition is naturally satisfied in such settings. In particular,
for any agent i ∈ I, the payoff types are completely ordered via a single path. We omit the
proof of the following standard lemma.
Lemma 2. For any dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i, the shortest path
from the source v0 to any payoff type vm ∈ Vi is
vm i vm−1 i . . . i v1 i v0.
In what follows, we present the primitive condition for regularity. An equivalent
formulation of the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design problem is
max
p(·), t(·)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v)
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀m = 2, . . . ,M, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,
p(v1, v−i) · Aiv1 − ti(v1, v−i) = 0, (10)
p(vm, v−i) · Aivm − ti(vm, v−i) = p(vm−1, v−i) · Aivm − ti(vm−1, v−i), (11)
∀m ≥ l, p(vm, v−i) · Ai ≥ p(vl, v−i) · Ai, (12)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K, pk(v) ≥ 0,
∀v ∈ V,∑
k∈K
pk(v) = 1,
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where (10) and (11) are binding incentive constraints and (12) is the monotonicity constraint.13
From (10) and (11), by induction, we have
ti(vm, v−i) = p(vm, v−i) · Aivm − γ
m−1∑
m′=1
p(vm′ , v−i) · Ai. (13)
Let Fi(vi, v−i) =
∑
vˆi≤vi pi(vˆi, v−i) denote the cumulative distribution function of i’s
payoff type conditional on the other agents having payoff type profile v−i. Define the virtual
valuation of agent i as
ri(v) = vi − γ 1− Fi(v)
pi(v) .
Using (13), we can rewrite the objective function as follows:
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v) =
∑
v∈V
∑
i∈I
pi(v)p(v) · Airi(v)
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)p(v) ·∑
i∈I
Airi(v). (14)
First ignore the monotonicity constraint (12). The optimization problem can be solved by
pointwise maximization. The mechanism designer chooses decision rule p∗ such that for each
v ∈ V , p∗ attaches positive probability to alternative k only if k ∈ arg maxk′ ∑i∈I ak′i ri(v). We
now impose a regularity condition that ensures that p∗ automatically satisfies the monotonicity
constraint (12). For each alternative k, let Kk,infi denote the collection of alternatives that
agent i considers inferior to alternative k; that is, Kk,infi = {k′ ∈ K : ak′i < aki }.
Definition 10. We say that pi is regular if the virtual valuations satisfy the following condition:
for each v ∈ V, j ∈ I,
k ∈ arg max
k′
∑
i∈I
ak
′
i ri(v)⇒ Kk,infj ∩ arg max
k′
∑
i∈I
ak
′
i ri(vˆj, v−j) = ∅ (15)
for every vˆj > vj.
Remark 3. The regularity condition (15) is the primitive condition for the regularity in
Definition 9, when we restrict attention to environments with one-dimensional types. In the
single-unit auction setting, our regularity condition (15) reduces to the regularity condition in
Chung and Ely (2007).
13It is well known that this is equivalent to cyclical monotonicity in environments with one-dimensional
payoff types.
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The regularity condition (15) ensures that under p∗, for any alternative k chosen with
positive probability for payoff type profile (vl, v−i), when agent i’s payoff type increases from
vl to vm, alternatives that are inferior than alternative k from agent i’s point of view will
not be chosen. It must be that p∗(vm, v−i) · Ai ≥ p∗(vl, v−i) · Ai for m ≥ l. The decision rule
automatically satisfies the monotonicity constraint (12). The following corollary establishes
the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in environments with one-dimensional
types.
Corollary 1. If pi satisfies the regularity condition (15), the use of dominant-strategy mech-
anisms has a Bayesian/ maxmin foundation.
4.2 Multi-unit auction with capacity-constrained bidders
In addition to environments with one-dimensional payoff types, the uniform shortest-path tree
condition is also satisfied in some multi-dimensional environments. Solving for the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism in a multi-dimensional environment is in general a daunting
task. In this subsection, we examine a specific case where the multi-dimensional analysis can
be simplified.
Consider the problem of finding the revenue maximizing auction when bidders have
constant marginal valuations as well as capacity constraints.14 Both the marginal values
and capacity constraints are private information to the bidders. Bidder i’s payoff type is
represented by vi = (a, b), where a is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for each
unit and b is the largest number of units she seeks. Units beyond the bth unit are worthless.
Let the range of a be A = {1, 2, . . . , A} and the range of b be B = {1, 2, . . . , B}. The seller
has Q units to sell.
A crucial assumption is that bidders cannot inflate the capacity but can shade it down.
In other words, the auctioneer can verify, partially, the claims made by a bidder. Although
this assumption seems odd in the selling context, it is natural in a procurement setting.
Consider a procurement auction where the auctioneer wishes to procure Q units from bidders
with constant marginal costs and limited capacity. No bidder will inflate his capacity when
bidding because of the huge penalties associated with not being able to fulfill the order.
14Malakhov and Vohra (2009) studies the optimal Bayesian mechanism in such an environment, assuming
independent types.
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Equivalently, we may suppose that the designer can verify that claims that exceed capacity
are false. The logic of our arguments can be easily adopted to deal with this case. More
explicitly, for any payoff types vi and v′i, we introduce a directed edge v′i → vi only if vi can
pretend to be v′i.
The following lemma is an analogous result of Malakhov and Vohra (2009, Theorem 6).
While they focus on the optimal Bayesian mechanism in such an environment, we study the
optimal dominant-strategy mechanism. Their proof technique can be adopted to establish
the shortest-path tree for any dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i.
Lemma 3. For any dsIC decision rule p and other agents’ reports v−i, the shortest path
from the source v0 to any payoff type (a, b) is
(a, b) i (a− 1, b) i . . . i (1, b) i (1, b− 1) i . . . i (1, 1) i v0.
3,3 2,3 1,3
3,2 2,2 1,2
3,1 2,1 1,1 v0
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the shortest path from the source v0 to any payoff type
(a, b). For example, the shortest-path from v0 to (3, 3) is: (3, 3) i (2, 3) i (1, 3) i (1, 2) i
(1, 1) i v0, highlighted in blue.
Let Fb,v−i(a) =
∑a
x=1 pi((x, b), v−i).
Corollary 2. If pi satisfies the following regularity condition: ∀v−i,∀(a, b) ≥ (a′, b′),
a− 1− Fb,v−i(a)
pi((a, b), v−i)
≥ a′ − 1− Fb′,v−i(a
′)
pi((a′, b′), v−i)
, (16)
then the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations.
The derivation of the regularity condition (16) is an analogous result of Malakhov and
Vohra (2009, Theorem 7). When pi is independent, the regularity condition (16) reduces to
the regularity condition in Malakhov and Vohra (2009, Theorem 7).
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4.3 Bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders
In this subsection, we apply Theorem 2 to the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified
traders; see for example, Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) and Lu and Robert (2001).
Each agent is endowed with 12 unit of a good to be traded and has private information about
her valuation for the good. Each agent may be either the buyer or the seller, depending on
the realization of the privately observed information and the choice of the mechanism: the
agent’s role as the buyer or the seller is endogenously determined by her report and cannot
be identified prior to trade. Agent 1’s valuation for the good could be either 18 or 38. Agent
2’s valuation for the good could be either 10 or 30.
A broker chooses trading mechanisms that maximize the expected profit; see for example,
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, Section 5), Lu and Robert (2001), and Börgers (2015).
The broker has the following estimate of the distribution of the agents’ valuations:15
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
v2 = 10 38
1
8
v2 = 30 18
3
8
Each trading mechanism can characterized by three outcomes functions (p, t1, t2), where
p(v1, v2) is the number of units agent 1 buys from agent 2, t1(v1, v2) is the payment from
agent 1 to the broker, and t2(v1, v2) is the payment from agent 2 to the broker, if v1 and v2
are the reported valuations of agent 1 and agent 2. Agent 1’s utility from purchasing p units
of the good and paying a transfer t1 is pv1− t1, and agent 2’s utility from selling p unit of the
good and paying a transfer t2 is −pv2 − t2, where −12 ≤ p ≤ 12 . The broker chooses a trading
mechanism that maximizes the expected profit.
Using a linear programming solver (MATLAB), we can solve for the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism Γ as follows, where the first number in each cell indicates the number
of units agent 1 buys from agent 2, the second number is the transfer from agent 1 to the
mechanism designer, and the third number is the transfer from agent 2 to the mechanism
15This example is robust to small perturbations in the agents’ valuations or the broker’s estimate of the
distribution of the agents’ valuations.
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designer.
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
v2 = 10 12 , 9,−5 12 , 9,−15
v2 = 30 −12 ,−9, 15 12 , 19,−15
Following Theorem 2, there is neither a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
The construction of a superior mechanism Γ′ follows immediately from Theorem 2. We use
a to denote the first-order belief of a low-valuation type of agent 2 that agent 1 has low
valuation. In this mechanism, the mechanism designer elicits agent 2’s first-order belief about
agent 1’s valuation.
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
v2 = 10, a ∈ [0, 12) −12 ,−9, 15 12 , 19,−15
v2 = 10, a ∈ [12 , 1] 12 , 9,−5 12 , 9,−5
v2 = 30 −12 ,−9, 15 12 , 19,−15
4.4 Auction with type-dependent outside option
Besides the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified traders (Section 4.3), we present
here another environment to illustrate the usefulness of Theorem 2. A single unit of an
indivisible object is up for sale. There are two risk-neutral bidders. Each bidder’s payoff type
is represented by (a, b) ∈ R2+, where a is the maximum amount she is willing to pay, and b
is the value of her outside option. Bidder 1’s payoff type could be either (20, 0) or (40, 5).
Bidder 2’s payoff type could be either (10, 0) or (30, 5). The auctioneer has the following
estimate of the distribution of the agents’ payoff types:
v1 = (20, 0) v1 = (40, 5)
v2 = (10, 0) 38
1
8
v2 = (30, 5) 18
3
8
Using a linear programming solver (MATLAB), we can solve for the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism Γ as follows, where the first number in each cell indicates the probability
that agent 1 gets the object, the second number is the probability that agent 2 gets the object,
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the third number is the transfer from agent 1 to the auctioneer, and the fourth number is the
transfer from agent 2 to the auctioneer. Following Theorem 2, there is neither a Bayesian
foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
v1 = (20, 0) v1 = (40, 5)
v2 = (10, 0) 1, 0, 20, 0 1, 0, 20,−5
v2 = (30, 5) 0, 1, 0, 25 1, 0, 35,−5
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
in a general social choice environment with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We
propose a notion of uniform shortest-path tree, that under regularity, ensures the maxmin and
Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. When the condition is violated, we
show that maxmin/ Bayesian foundations might not exist, and we apply this no foundation
result to bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders and auction with type dependent
outside options.
In an independent and contemporaneous work, Yamashita and Zhu (2017) study the
foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in the interdependent-value setting.
They focus on a class of environments in which a single-crossing condition holds, and in which
the order derived from the single-crossing condition is a total order. They show that, under
“no ordinal interdependence” and certain regularity conditions, the use of ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations. Their proof is a direct
extension of Chung and Ely (2007) in the private-value setting to the interdependent-value
environment. Our proof technique (duality approach) in Theorem 1 can be used to establish
the foundation result in their paper; see Remark 1. Yamashita and Zhu (2017) also present a
no-foundation result under certain conditions. Our no-foundation result does not imply their
no-foundation result, and vice versa. In particular, our Theorem 2 and its applications show
that even in private-value settings in which there is no (cardinal or ordinal) interdependence
in payoffs, the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms might
not exist.16
16We thank the Associate Editor for encouraging us to explore the relation between our work and that of
Yamashita and Zhu (2017).
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Step (1) First consider the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design problem (DIC−P ).
We derive its dual minimization problem (DIC −D) as follows:
min
λDIC(vi,v−i), µDIC(v)
∑
v∈V
µDIC(v) (DIC −D)
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,
λDIC(vi, v−i)−
∑
v′i: v′iivi
λDIC(v′i, v−i) = pi(vi, v−i), (17)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K,∑
i∈I
λDIC(vi, v−i)vi(k)−
∑
i∈I
∑
v′i: v′iivi
λDIC(v′i, v−i)v′i(k) ≤ µDIC(v), (18)
∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi,∀v−i ∈ V−i,
λDIC(vi, v−i) ≥ 0, (19)
where λDIC(vi, v−i) is the multiplier on the incentive constraint of preferring vi over v−i when
other agents report v−i (see (5)), and µDIC(v) is the multiplier associated with the feasibility
constraint of ∑k∈K pk(v) = 1 (see (7)). By induction, we can derive the following from (17):
λDIC(vi, v−i) =
∑
vˆi: vˆi+i vi
pi(vˆi, v−i). (20)
Step (2) Say that a type space is simple if for each agent i ∈ I and payoff type vi ∈ Vi,
there is a unique type for agent i with payoff type vi. Let the set of types for agent i be
equal to the set of possible payoff types; that is, Ωi = Vi. We take fi to be the identity. For
notational ease, we will write τi(·|vi) = gi(vi)[·] for the belief of type vi of agent i about the
types of the other agents.
A simple type space can be embedded into the universal type space; see Chung and Ely
(2007, Lemma 1). Indeed, the simple type space which we construct can be embedded into the
universal type space by an embedding φ : V → Ω∗. Since the designer’s assumption is required
to be consistent with her estimate pi on V , the estimate induces a distribution/assumption
pi ◦φ−1 on the universal type space. From now on, we restrict attention to simple type spaces.
This simplifies the analysis in the rest of the proof.
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We can formulate the optimal Bayesian mechanism design problem as follows:
max
p(·), ti(·)
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈I
ti(v) (BIC − P )
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v′i ∈ Vi ∪ {v0},∑
v−i∈V−i
τi(v−i|vi)
[
p(vi, v−i) · vi − ti(vi, v−i)
]
≥ ∑
v−i∈V−i
τi(v−i|vi)
[
p(v′i, v−i) · vi − ti(v′i, v−i)
]
, (21)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K, pk(v) ≥ 0,
∀v ∈ V, ∑
k∈K
pk(v) = 1. (22)
We derive the dual minimization problem (BIC −D) as follows:
min
λBIC(v′i;vi), µBIC(v)
∑
v∈V
µBIC(v) (BIC −D)
subject to ∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v−i ∈ V−i,∑
v′i∈Vi∪{v0}
λBIC(v′i; vi)τi(v−i|vi)−
∑
v′i∈Vi
λBIC(vi; v′i)τi(v−i|v′i) = pi(vi, v−i), (23)
∀v ∈ V, ∀k ∈ K,∑
i∈I
∑
v′i∈Vi∪{v0}
λBIC(v′i; vi)τi(v−i|vi)vi(k)
+
∑
i∈I
∑
v′i∈Vi
λBIC(vi; v′i)τi(v−i|v′i)v′i(k) ≤ µBIC(v), (24)
∀i ∈ I, ∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀v′i ∈ Vi ∪ {v0},
λBIC(v′i; vi) ≥ 0, (25)
where λBIC(v′i; vi) is the multiplier on the incentive constraint of preferring vi over v′i (see (21)),
and µBIC(v) is the multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint of ∑k∈K pk(v) = 1
(see (22)).
Step (3) Our objective is to identify a simple type space, against which VDIC−D ≥
VBIC−D. We claim that under simple type space (to be identified), for any feasible dual
variables λDIC(vi, v−i) and µDIC(v), and its corresponding objective function value in the
minimization problem (DIC−D), there exist feasible dual variables λBIC(v′i; vi) and µBIC(v)
in the minimization problem (BIC −D) such that its objective function achieves the same
value.
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By inspecting the constraints in the two minimization problems (DIC − D) and
(BIC −D), in particular, by comparing (17) with (23), (18) with (24), and (19) with (25),
the claim is true if there exists τi(v−i|vi) such that17
λBIC(v−i ; vi)τi(v−i|vi) = λDIC(vi, v−i), (26)
λBIC(v′i; vi) = 0 if v′i 6= v−i , (27)
µBIC(v) = µDIC(v). (28)
Summing across v−i for (26), we have
λBIC(v−i ; vi) =
∑
v−i∈V−i
λDIC(vi, v−i),
=
∑
v−i∈V−i
∑
vˆi: vˆi+i vi
pi(vˆi, v−i),
where the second line follows from (20). From (26), we can solve for τi(v−i|vi) as follows:
τi(v−i|vi) = λ
DIC(vi, v−i)
λBIC(v−i ; vi)
=
∑
vˆi: vˆi+i vi pi(vˆi, v−i)∑
v−i∈V−i
∑
vˆi: vˆi+i vi pi(vˆi, v−i)
.
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